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I. INTRODUCTION
The government has begun to prosecute the crime of providing material
support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations, codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (§ 2339B). The United States criminalized such
activity in the 1996 Anti-Terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act, but few
indictments alleging the crime were returned before September 11, 2001.1
Since then, prosecutions have increased and can be expected to increase
further because the broad provisions of the statute create a major, new
prosecutorial tool criminalizing behavior connected to terrorism. Indeed,
one commentator notes, "[v]irtually every criminal 'terrorism' case that the
government has filed since September 11 has included a charge that the
defendant provided material support to a terrorist organization."2
One of the crucial unsettled issues concerning § 2339B is the mens rea
required for a conviction. The government has contended that the crime is
essentially one of strict liability where a person can be convicted without
having a guilty mental state. This article contends, on the other hand, that
the statute as enacted requires that a person know that he is donating to a
group that has been designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign
terrorist organization. The article further contends that the First
Amendment requires the government to prove that a donation to an
organization was made with the specific intent to further an organization's
terrorist activities in order for a conviction to be constitutional.
Part II of the article sets out the statutory framework of which § 2339B
is a part. Part III discusses important considerations in determining what
the mens rea should be for a § 2339B prosecution. Part IV explores how
other crimes have been interpreted to determine the mens rea required by
this statute. Part V examines the framework for determining when a
criminal statute infringes the First Amendment's right of association. Part
VI analyzes the cases that have held that a person can be penalized for
associating with groups that have both legal and illegal goals only if the
1see DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 127 (2d ed.
2002) ("[A]s of December 2001, the government had prosecuted only three cases involving
material support to terrorist organizations.").
2 David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003).
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person had the specific intent to further the illegal aims of the group. Part
VII discusses judicial interpretations of § 2339B and the right of
association. Part VIII explores various consequences that can occur if a
person can be convicted of violating § 2339B without the specific intent to
further the terrorist goals of the organizations where donations have gone.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
A. Section 2339B
The basic criminalizing provision of the statute provides:
Whoever, within the United States or subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years,
or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be
imprisoned for any term of years or for life.3
"Material support or resources" is broadly defined. This term, as defined
by the statute:
[M]eans currency or monetary instruments or financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert
advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel,
transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine
or religious materials.4
Section 2339B, however, neither lists the proscribed organizations nor
defines them. Instead, the statute states that a terrorist organization is "an
organization designated as a terrorist organization under § 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act," 5 which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189
(§ 1189).
318 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West Supp. 2004).
418 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b) (West Supp. 2004).
'18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6) (2000).
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B. The Designation of a Foreign Terrorist Organization
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General, is authorized to designate a group as a
foreign terrorist organization if the Secretary finds that the group is foreign,
engages in, or has the capacity or intent to engage in terrorist activity, and
"threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of
the United States."6
Before making the designation, the Secretary of State must
confidentially inform the leaders of Congress of the intent to designate a
group as a foreign terrorist organization and the reasons for the proposed
action.7 The designation takes effect when it is published in the Federal
Register seven days after this communication.
Congress has the power to override the designation, 8 and the Secretary
of State can find that changed circumstances support the designation's
revocation.9 Otherwise, the classification lasts for two years, at which time
a group can be redesignated a foreign terrorist organization for another two
year term with no limit on the number of possible redesignations.10
68 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2004).
71d. § 1 189(a)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2004).
Seven days before making a designation under this subsection, the Secretary
shall, by classified communication, notify the Speaker and the Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore, Majority
Leader, and Minority Leader of the Senate, and the members of the relevant
committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate, in writing, of the
intent to designate an organization under this subsection, together with the
findings made under paragraph (1) with respect to that organization, and the
factual basis therefore.
Id.
'Id. § 1189(a)(2)(B)(ii) ("Any designation under this subsection shall cease to have effect
upon an Act of Congress disapproving such designation.").
91d. § 1189(a)(6)(A).
The Secretary may revoke a designation made under paragraph (1) or
redesignation made under paragraph (4)(B) if the Secretary finds that -- (i)
the circumstances that were the basis for the designation or redesignation
have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation; or (ii) the national
security of the United States warrants a revocation.
Id.
'
0 ld. § 1189(a)(4)(B).
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The Secretary of State may designate an organization under § 1189 only
if it engages in terrorist activity or "retains the capability and intent to
engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. . . " This provision incorporates
two definitions of "engages in terrorist activity."' 2 The first is limited to
violent action and states that "'terrorism' means premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents."' 3 The second definition, however, is more
expansive and goes beyond the commission of violent or politically
motivated acts. A "terrorist activity" is an illegal act where committed or
under United States law if committed here and involves any of the
following:
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance....
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure,
or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel
a third person (including a governmental organization) to
do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
condition for the release of the individual seized or
detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected
person (as defined in § 1116(b)(4) of Title 18) or upon the
liberty of such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any-
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon
or device, or
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous
device (other than for mere personal monetary gain)
with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of
one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to
property.
"Id. § 1189(a)(1)(B).
12 id.
"322 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2000).
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(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the
foregoing.1
4
"Engage in terrorist activity" includes not only the commission or
incitement of a terrorist act but also planning a terrorist activity, soliciting
money, goods, or people for a terrorist activity or organization, or providing
material support to a terrorist organization unless the actor demonstrates
that he did not know and should not have reasonably known that the act
would further terrorism.
1 5
148 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 2004).
"8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (West Supp. 2004).
As used in this chapter, the term "engage in terrorist activity" means, in an
individual capacity or as a member of an organization--
(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an
intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;
(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;
(III) to gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity;
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for--
(aa) a terrorist activity;
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II)
[organizations designated by the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189
or otherwise designated by the Secretary as terrorist organization]; or
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III) [a group of two or
more who engage in the activities set forth in (1), (II), or (III) above]...
(V) to solicit any individual--
(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this clause;
(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(1) or
(vi)(II); or
(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III),
unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not
reasonably have known, that the solicitation would further the organization's
terrorist activity; or
(VI) to commit an act that the actors knows, or reasonably should know,
affords material support, including a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit,
false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical,
biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training--
[Vol. 56:3
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The definitions of terrorism include much of what might not usually be
thought of as terrorism but just ordinary criminal behavior. For example,
the kind of car bombing often ascribed to organized crime would be
covered since it would be sabotage of a vehicle. An ordinary kidnapping
would be covered as the detention of one person in order to compel money
from another. The provision does not narrow assassination. A dictionary
definition, however, includes many murders because assassination, while
often thought of as a political killing, is not so limited. Assassinate is
defined as "to kill suddenly or secretively, esp. to murder a politically
prominent person."' 16 Arson often uses accelerants to speed the progress of
a fire, and those accelerants are chemical agents, and therefore such an
arson, for any motive, is a terrorist activity. The use of a firearm with intent
to harm someone is covered if there is some motive other than mere
personal monetary gain. Many shootings will qualify since many are
motivated at least partly by animosity, fear, thrills, or revenge. Under these
definitions, an incredibly large number of groups around the world commit
terrorism. 17
(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, has
committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity;
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the actor
can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have
known, that the act would further the organization's terrorist activity.
Id.
At least one of the qualifications that might seem to limit this definition seems to be wiped
out by the subsequent clause. Thus, the definition includes the commission or incitement to
commit a terrorist activity only "under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or
serious bodily injury .... Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I). But the next phrase includes the
preparation or planning for every terrorist activity without any limitation, and activities can be
"terrorist" according to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) without an intent to cause death or serious
bodily injury. The limitation on the commission of terrorist acts to those with the intent to cause
serious bodily injuries hardly matters unless the excluded actions are undertaken without any
preparation or planning, for if there has been preparation or planning it is covered in the definition
even without the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury.
16RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 80 (2d ed. 1999).
17 See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 120 ("There are literally hundreds if not thousands
of groups worldwide that engage at least in part in violent activities.").
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To be designated a foreign terrorist organization the organization must
not only be foreign and engage in terrorist activity, that activity must also
"threaten[] the security of United States nationals or the national security of
the United States."' 8 This qualification, however, broadly defines national
security as "the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of
the United States."' 9 With a global economy and a direct or indirect
American corporate presence nearly everywhere, the criminal conduct that
qualifies as terrorism could nearly always be thought to threaten the
economic interests of the United States.2°
The result of these broad definitions is that much discretion is ceded to
the Secretary of State. The Secretary is not required to designate every
group that qualifies as a foreign terrorist organization but is merely
authorized to make the designation if a group falls within the definitions.
From the many organizations around the world that fall within the
definitions, the Secretary, exercising basically unchecked discretion,
determines which organizations actually will be designated a foreign
terrorist organization, 21 and thus the Secretary determines whether giving
material support to an organization will be a crime.
C. Judicial Review of the Designation
A designated organization "may seek judicial review of the designation
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"
but must do so no later than thirty days after the designation is published in
the Federal Register. The Secretary in making a designation must create
an administrative record and may consider classified information. The
reviewing court may only consider that administrative record and any
188 U.S.C.A. § II89(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2004).
198 U.S.C. § I I89(c)(2) (2000).
20See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 120 ("The Act's terms encompass groups whose
activities threaten the security of U.S. nationals, meaning any U.S. tourist or corporate outpost
anywhere in the world.").
2 1See Jennifer A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 701 (1998) ("[T]he
Secretary of State has the broad power to designate a wide variety of groups with limited
safeguards against wrongful designation."). See also COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 119-20
("Since courts are reluctant to second-guess the Secretary of State on what threatens our foreign
policy, the law effectively gives the Secretary of State a blank check to blacklist disfavored
foreign groups.").
228 U.S.C. § 1 189(b)(1) (2000).
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classified information, which the court receives ex parte and in camera,
used in making the designation.23 The court may set aside the designation
only if the Secretary acted unconstitutionally, illegally, or arbitrarily in
making it, or if the designation does not have substantial support in the
administrative record or classified information.24
While a designated organization is permitted judicial review of the
designation, the designation procedures prohibit a person accused of
providing a designated organization with material support or resources from
challenging the legality of the designation in the criminal case: "A
defendant in a criminal action... shall not be permitted to raise any
question concerning the validity of the issuance of such designation or
redesignation as a defense or an objection at any trial or hearing. ' 25
III. SOME CONSIDERATIONS IN DETERMINING THE MENS REA FOR
SECTION 2339B
Some aspects of this statutory scheme have special relevance in
considering the mental states necessary for a conviction under § 2339B.
First, it is only a crime under § 2339B to donate resources when a group has
been officially designated a foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary
of State. While the definitions of terrorist activity are so broad that many
organizations could be designated, only a comparative handful out of the
potential pool have been so designated.26  Seldom will it be a crime to
"38 U.S.C.A. § 1 189(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2004).24Id. § 1189(b)(3).
The Court shall hold unlawful and set aside a designation the Court finds
to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of
statutory right;
(D) lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole
or in classified information submitted to the court under paragraph (2), or
(E) not in accord with the procedures required by law.
Id.25Id. § 1 189(a)(8) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
26See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 120-21.
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donate to an organization that could be designated because most often that
group will not have been designated.
Second, it is quite likely that a donor will not know that his donation is
going to a designated organization. The official designation notice is
placed in the Federal Register, and nothing indicates that the government
publicizes the designations beyond that official notice. Few people in the
general population are avid readers of the Federal Register, and the donor
can easily be unaware that a donation is going to a designated group and
that it is, therefore, illegal.
Furthermore, a person donating to a designated organization is not
necessarily aware that his action is somehow aiding terrorism. The
designated groups often do much more than commit terrorist acts. They
also undertake important and worthwhile charitable, humanitarian,
educational, or political activities.27 Indeed, organizations that might seem
praiseworthy to many, and indeed may in fact be praiseworthy, can be
designated. For example, "[i]f this law had been on the books in the 1980s,
it would have been a crime to give money to the African National Congress
during Nelson Mandela's speaking tours here, because the State
Department routinely listed the ANC as a 'terrorist group."'
' 28
Resources, then, may have been solicited by a designated group for the
organization's good deeds; the donor may have given solely to further those
The designation authority invites selective enforcement. The Secretary
of State can pick and choose which groups to designate, based on the politics
of the moment.... There are literally hundreds if not thousands of groups
worldwide that engage at least in part in violent activities. Practically
speaking, the government must necessarily enforce such authority
selectively.
Id.
27 See, e.g., COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 85.
Movements and groups that can be labeled terrorist are often engaged in
both legal and illegal activities. The IRA had Sinn Fein, a legal arm engaged
in legitimate political activity. The African National Congress engaged in
both violent "terrorist" acts and nonviolent anti-apartheid activity. And
according to Israeli security services, Hamas, one of the world's most
notorious "terrorist groups," devotes ninety-five percent of its resources to
nonviolent social services.
Id.
•28 COLE &; DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 118.
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non-terrorist activities; 29 and in fact the donation may have been used not
for terrorism but for charitable, humanitarian, educational, or political
goals. Two organizations at the center of the most important litigation
about § 2339B illustrate these possibilities.
By October 1997, the Secretary of State had designated thirty
organizations as foreign terrorist organizations including the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).30
While the PKK and LTTE were officially labeled terrorist by the
government, the litigation also indicated that the two organizations did
much more than commit violent actions. 31 They also performed peaceful
educational, humanitarian, diplomatic, and advocacy functions.32
The PKK, formed about twenty-five years ago, consists of Turkish
Kurds and seeks self-determination for the Kurds in Southeastern Turkey.
It has undertaken worldwide advocacy and diplomatic activities to further
its goal, including organizing political forums, international conferences,
and cultural festivals outside Turkey. 33  In Humanitarian Law Project v.
Reno, the court concluded that the PKK "publishes and distributes
newspapers and pamphlets championing the Kurds' cause and denouncing
human right violations34 It provides social services and humanitarian aid to
Kurds in exile, has established a quasi-governmental structure in areas of
29 See, e.g., Jacqueline Benson, Send Me Your Money: Controlling International Terrorism by
Restricting Fundraising in the United States, 21 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 321, 343 (1999).
A good example of an organization with multiple purposes is HAMAS.
HAMAS was created as a nonprofit religious and charitable organization
focused on conservative religious activity. Some estimate that as much as
ninety-five percent of HAMAS' activities are focused on social welfare and
religious work and only five percent are terrorist. HAMAS attracts funds
from donors due to its reputation for providing relief to poor people,
especially those in the Gaza Strip. Many view HAMAS as less corrupt than
other relief networks.
Id. 30 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by
Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Dep't of Justice, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18933 (9th
Cir. Sept. 8, 2004).31Id. At 1180-82.
32 See id. at 1180-81.
33 id.
34
id.
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Turkey under its control, and defends the Kurds from alleged Turkish
human rights abuses. 35
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam seek self-determination for Tamil
residents in a portion of Sri Lanka, where the Tamils allegedly have been
subjected to human rights abuses by the governing majority in Sir Lanka.36
The LTTE engages in advocacy and diplomacy to aid its goal, runs
orphanages, aids refugees and provides other social services, and supports
economic development of the Tamils.
37
A person donating money or other resources to these organizations may
have different mental states concerning terrorism and their donations. The
donors may not know that the organizations are designated. From the
donors' standpoint, they are merely making a charitable donation like any
other laudable charitable gift. The donors, on the other hand, might be
aware that the organizations have been designated and be giving the
resources either with the aim of aiding its terrorism or its non-terrorist
functions, or both, or be simply indifferent to how the donation is used.
Finally, the donor could be aware that the organization has committed
terrorist acts, but not aware of the designation, and be giving the resources
either with the aim of aiding its terrorism or its non-terrorist functions, or
both, or be simply indifferent to how the donation is used.
Which, if any, of these acts is illegal depends on the mental state
required by § 2339B. This requires two inquiries. First, the statute must be
interpreted to see what mens rea it requires. Then, the First Amendment's
right of association must be examined to see what, if any, mental state it
requires for a § 2339B conviction to be constitutional.
IV. THE STATUTE'S MENS REA REQUIREMENT
A. The Government's Position
Section 2339B makes it a crime when a person "knowingly provides
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization. . .. "38
Congress defines the elements of a crime,39 and its use of the word
35 ld
"361d. at 1182.
37 See Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 391 (9th
Cir. 2003), vacated by 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18933 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2004).
3818 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West Supp. 2004).
39 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) ("The definition of the elements of
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"knowingly" in § 2339B indicates that it intended to require some mental
state with respect to some element of the crime.40 The statutory language,
however, is not clear. "Knowingly" could just modify "provides," but it
could also modify the other elements: "material support or resources" and
"to a foreign terrorist organization."
The differences are significant. If "knowingly" only modifies
"provides," the mental state will be satisfied by any donation that is not
accidental or inadvertent of material support to a group that is a designated
foreign terrorist organization. The donor would not have to know that the
aid is material support and, more important, would not have to know that
the contribution is going to a designated foreign terrorist organization. The
act could be perfectly innocent, indeed normally praiseworthy, for a person
could be writing a check to a group whom she believes will use the money
for humanitarian or political purposes unaware that the organization has
been designated as terrorist by the Secretary of State. If "knowingly" only
modifies "provides," however, the intended good deed is criminal and can
result in a fifteen year sentence. Charitable giving will have taken on
previously unknown risks.
The government advocates this limited mens rea. It has maintained that
a person is guilty under § 2339B, as the Ninth Circuit has summarized in
Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Dep 't of Justice:
[I]f he or she donates support to a designated organization
even if he or she does not know the organization is so
designated. That is, according to the government, it can
convict an individual who gives money to a designated
organization that solicits money at their doorstep so long as
the organization identifies itself by name. It is no defense,
according to the government, that the organization
describes to the donor only its humanitarian work to
a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which
are solely creatures of statute.").40Compare this to Liparota, which considered the mental state required by a federal statute
criminalizing food stamp fraud by stating that "'whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires,
alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or
the regulations' is subject to a fine and imprisonment." Id. at 420 (quoting Food Stamp Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 14, 78 Stat. 708, amended by, 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1984) (current
version at 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (2000)) (alteration in original). The Court concluded that
"Congress certainly intended by the use of the word 'knowingly' to require some mental state with
respect to some element of the crime .. " Id. at 424.
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provide basic services to support victims displaced and
orphaned by conflict, or to defend the cultural and
linguistic rights of ethnic minorities. And, the government
further contends, it is no defense that a donor contributes
money solely to support the lawful, humanitarian purposes
of a designated organization.41
In other words, according to the government, personal guilt is not
required to convict a person of donating material resources to a foreign
terrorist organization under § 2339B, for the crime is essentially one of
strict liability that requires no scienter. This conclusion, however, flies in
the face of Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the issue of mens rea.
B. Basic Mens Rea Requirements
The Court has long recognized that at our criminal law's core is the
concept that, in the words of Justice Jackson, "wrongdoing must be
conscious to be criminal. . Consequently, as Justice Thomas said for
41Humanitarian Law Project, 352 F.3d at 397. The court also stated that according to the
government's interpretation:
[A] person who simply sends a check to a school or orphanage in Tamil
Eelam run by the LTTE could be convicted under the statute, even if that
individual is not aware of the LTTE's designation or of any unlawful
activities undertaken by the LTTE. Or,... a woman who buys cookies from
a bake sale outside of her grocery store to support displaced Kurdish
refugees to find new homes could be held liable so long as the bake sale had
a sign that said that the sale was sponsored by the PKK, without regard to her
knowledge of the PKK's designation or other activities.
Id. at 402.
42Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1950). In a frequently quoted passage,
Justice Jackson explained:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted
by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will
and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between
good and evil. A relation between some mental element and punishment for
a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory 'But
I didn't mean to' .... Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English
common law in the Eighteenth Century was indicated by Blackstone's
sweeping statement that to constitute any crime there must first be a "vicious
will."
[Vol. 56:3
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the Court in Staples v. United States, a criminal statute is construed "in light
of the background rules of the common law... in which the requirement of
some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded. 4 3 Even if the statute does
not expressly require scienter, courts generally interpret the statute to
require conscious wrongdoing.4 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. concluded, the Court's cases
indicate "that the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should
apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent
conduct.,
45
These principles indicate that § 2339B should be read so that
"knowingly" modifies each of its elements. Normally it is innocent conduct
to provide an organization with goods and services. Such an act can be
considered conscious wrongdoing, and therefore subject to criminal
penalties, only if the person knew that the donation was going to a terrorist
organization.
C. Public Welfare Offenses
The Court, however, has also accepted a subset of crimes that do not
require a showing of personal guilt. These crimes of strict liability, as
Chief Justice Burger stated in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
however, are limited and disfavored.46 Such crimes, often labeled public
welfare offenses, usually concern dangerous products or items that are often
subject to extensive regulation in the interest of public safety.47 Such
crimes can dispense with the normal mens rea requirements because those
involved with dangerous products can reasonably be expected to be aware
of the possibility of regulation. They should learn the requisite law, and if
Id. at 250-51 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21).
43511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (citation omitted).
44See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) (stating that there is a
presumption "that some form of scienter is to be implied in a criminal statute even if not
expressed .....
4 5
1d. at 72.
46438 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1978) (citations omitted) ("While strict-liability offenses are not
unknown to the criminal law and do not invariably offend constitutional requirements .... the
limited circumstances in which Congress has created and this Court has recognized such
offenses... attest to their generally disfavored status.").
47 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 ("Typically, our cases recognizing such [public welfare]
offenses involve statutes that regulate potentially harmful or injurious items.").
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they do not, they act at their own peril.48  Consequently, the government
does not have to show that those accused of such offenses knew of the
regulations or intended to break them.
The crime of providing material resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, however, is not a public welfare offense. Such a donor is not
akin to the person dealing in dangerous products who reasonably can expect
extensive regulation of those substances. Indeed, just the opposite exists.
Society encourages charitable donations; there is no settled expectation that
such gifts are stringently regulated, much less banned.49 Normally, when
the law permits a conviction without a willful violation, as Justice Jackson
explained in Morissette v. United States, "[t]he accused, if he does not will
the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than
society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might
reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities."" The
charitable donor, however, has not assumed any responsibilities where
society can reasonably expect that she take steps to avoid breaking a law of
which she is unaware.
Furthermore, the Court has indicated that statutes should not be
interpreted so as to sweep within a crime otherwise significant innocent
48See id. (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943)) (discussing public
welfare offenses stating that "we have reasoned that as long as a defendant knows that he is
dealing with a dangerous device of a character that places him 'in responsible relation to a public
danger,'...he should be alerted to the probability of strict regulation .... ); see also United States
v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) ("[W]here... dangerous or
deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of
regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with
them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."). Cf United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
250, 254 (1922) (upholding a statute restricting sales of drugs without requiring knowledge by the
seller that such sales were restricted and stating that the statute's "manifest purpose is to require
every person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes within the
inhibition of the statute, and if he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize
him."); see also Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public
Welfare Offense Model, 53 Am. U. L. REv. 313, 330 (2003) (stating that when a person should
know that the conduct is subject to stringent regulation, "the failure to investigate and discern
whether the behavior is criminal equates to a type of negligent behavior, which can serve as the
substitute for a criminal mens rea. Hence, the unwitting or innocent conduct is really tinged with
a negligence that belies lack of culpability.").
49 See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 71 (deciding that a statute criminalizing the shipment of
sexually explicit images of minors required proof that the accused knew a performer was
underage "is not a public welfare offense. Persons do not harbor settled expectations that the
contents of magazines and films are generally subject to stringent public regulation.").
50342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952).
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activities. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, has stated, "[W]e have
taken [particular care] to avoid construing a statute to dispense with mens
rea where doing so would 'criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent
conduct." '' 51 If § 2339B does not require knowledge that a donation is
going to a designated organization, then much non-blameworthy conduct
will be swept within the crime. The guilty act can merely be a gift to what
the donor thinks is a charity, and a charitable donation is certainly not an
inherently guilty act. The person who responds to an appeal for relief after
an earthquake or to fund orphanages in a war torn area or a similar request
is not doing something intrinsically bad, but the opposite. If, however,
unknown to the donor, the recipient of the donation has been designated a
foreign terrorist organization, the charitable giving, according to the
government, is a serious crime. A limited mens rea for § 2339B would
criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.
Finally, public welfare offenses tend to carry comparatively minor
penalties that do little harm to the reputation of the offender.52 In contrast,
a violation of § 2339B is a felony carrying a severe punishment. 3 For these
reasons, as Justice Thomas said for the Court in Staples v. United States,
"absent a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is not required, we
should not apply the public welfare offense rationale to interpret any statute
defining a felony offense as dispensing with mens rea.,54
Both because the norm for a criminal conviction requires the showing of
a willful violation and because § 2339B is not a public welfare offense, the
statute mandates a mens rea requirement. Since § 2339B states that a
violation must be knowingly made, that mental state should apply to each
5 1Staples, 511 U.S. at 610 (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)); see
also X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 69 (describing how interpreting a statute to eliminate a
scienter requirement would sweep within its ambit much innocent behavior, and stating, "We do
not assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended such results."); cf United States v. Freed,
401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) ("[O]ne would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand
grenades is not an innocent act.").
52See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256 ("[Plenalties [for public welfare offenses] commonly are
relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender's reputation."); see also
Carpenter, supra note 48, at 321 ("[Tlhe hallmark of a public welfare offense is the relatively
modest punishment and stigma.").
53See Staples, 511 U.S. at 618 ("[Pjunishing a violation as a felony is simply incompatible
with the theory of the public welfare offense.").
54id.
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element of the crime. Most significantly, to be convicted, a person must
know that he is donating to a foreign terrorist organization. 55
D. Judicial Interpretation of Mens Rea for Section 2339B
In Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Department of Justice,5 6
the Ninth Circuit, in the leading interpretation of the mens rea required by
§ 2339B, agreed that the crime was not one of strict liability. But it then
fashioned a mental element that cannot be derived from the statutory
language:
[W]e believe that when Congress included the term
"knowingly" in § 2339B, it meant that proof that a
defendant knew of the organization's designation as a
terrorist organization or proof that a defendant knew of the
55If a conviction under § 2339B does not require an accused to know that a group was
designated, then it should be permissible to criminalize the provision of resources to any group
that has some illegal purposes even without a designation and even without the accused knowing
of those illegalities. The accused, even if he were a faithful reader of the Federal Register, would
not know if his charitable act was criminal. Perhaps this crime might be constitutionally attacked
as unconstitutionally vague because it does not give fair warning of what is criminal. See, e.g.,
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). But even if the crime does require a
designation, but not knowledge of the designation, the notice problem in reality is only slightly
different since few read the Federal Register before making a charitable donation.
56352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated by 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18933 (9th Cir. Sept. 8,
2004).
57The court noted that crimes normally require a mens rea. Id. at 397-98. Further, crimes
without a guilty intent are generally limited to "public welfare offenses." Id. at 399. Section
2339B, with its punishments of fifteen years and even life, is not the kind of crime that permits the
elimination of scienter. Id. at 401. Congress, by inserting "knowingly" into § 2339B, indicated
that it was not creating a crime of strict liability:
The language of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B does not in any way suggest that
Congress intended to impose strict liability on individuals who donate
"material support" to designated organizations. It is significant that
Congress used the term "knowingly" to modify "provid[ing] material support
or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.". . . Indeed, the Supreme
Court and our circuit have construed Congress' inclusion of the word
"knowingly" to require proof of knowledge of the law and an intent to
further the proscribed act.
Id. at 399 (alteration in original).
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unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated was
required to convict a defendant under the statute.
58
The fact that the second prong of this knowledge requirement is not in the
statute, makes little sense, and sweeps together both guilty and non-guilty
mental states.
The court in essence devised two definitions for foreign terrorist
organizations. Thus, a person can be convicted if he knew that the
organization to which he made a donation was designated by the Secretary
of State as a foreign terrorist organization or if he knew of the
"organization's unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated., 59
The statute, however, has but one definition. The statute does not
generically define a terrorist organization. It does not state that a terrorist
organization is any group which commits certain acts and then forbids
donations to such an enterprise. Instead, § 2339B states that a terrorist
organization is an "organization designated as a terrorist organization under
§ 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act," which is codified at 8
U.S.C. §1189.60 A group may have to commit terrorist acts to be
designated, but all such organizations are not terrorist organizations within
the meaning of § 2339B. The crime forbids donations only to those groups
actually designated by the Secretary, not any others.
Indeed, what the Ninth Circuit meant by its second knowledge prong is
not exactly clear. It said that a conviction could be sustained if "the donor
had knowledge of the organization's unlawful activities that caused it to be
581d. The court subsequently stated:
Thus, to sustain a conviction under § 2339B, the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the donor had knowledge that the
organization was designated by the Secretary as a foreign terrorist
organization or that the donor had knowledge of the organization's unlawful
activities that caused it to be so designated.
Id. at 403. A previous panel of the Ninth Circuit, however, had seemingly concluded that
§ 2339B was a crime of strict liability. The court stated that "the term 'knowingly' modifies the
verb 'provides,' meaning that the only scienter requirement here is that the accused violator have
knowledge of the fact that he has provided something, not knowledge of the fact that what is
provided in fact constitutes material support." Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130,
1138 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Dep't of Justice,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18933 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2004). The court apparently treated this earlier
conclusion as dictum.
59 Humanitarian, 352 F.3d at 403.
6018 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6) (2000).
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so designated.",6' Taken on its face, this requires knowledge that could
never be proved. An accused would have to know what motivated the
Secretary of State to make a designation. The Secretary has discretion in
choosing among the groups that qualify as terrorist, and many factors, most
notably foreign policy ones, must affect whether an organization is
designated. On this level, it would seem impossible for anyone not privy to
the inner counsels of the State Department, to know what "caused" a
designation.
On the other hand, this prong of the Ninth Circuit's alternative mens rea
only requires knowledge of the group's "unlawful" actions that caused the
designation. However, that also seems unprovable in a criminal trial. Even
if a donor is aware that the organization to whom he has donated has
committed terrorist acts, he cannot know which among those acts has
caused the designation. Indeed, presumably the superior intelligence of the
United States government should normally allow the Secretary to operate
on knowledge that a donor would not have. Even if the designation is
caused by only part of the information that the Secretary has, the donor will
not know what the determinative information was.
Furthermore, a criminal trial will not have the evidence indicating what
caused the designation. The Secretary does not have to disclose to the jury
the information upon which a designation is based. The only time he is
required to reveal any basis for the designation is if the organization has
challenged it, and then the disclosure is restricted to the D.C. Circuit. 62 If in
what appears to be the usual case, the organization has not challenged the
designation, the Secretary has no duty to reveal the basis for the
designation.63 Even if the organization does challenge the designation, the
full basis for the Secretary's action does not have to be publicly presented.
The Secretary is permitted to rely on classified information, and that
information only has to be disclosed to the reviewing court and not to a
court trying an accused. 64 A criminal jury will not learn what unlawful
activities of an organization caused it to be designated and will not be able
to assess whether the accused had the Ninth Circuit's second-prong
knowledge.65
61 Humanitarian, 352 F.3d at 403.
61d. at 386.
63 id.
64Id.
65 See id.
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Perhaps, in spite of its language, what the Ninth Circuit intended was
that a person can be convicted under § 2339B if a person donates to an
organization knowing that it has committed terrorist acts, not that the donor
had to know what caused the Secretary of State to designate the
organization. This, too, would make for difficult proof problems at trial.
Apparently the government would have to prove both those terrorist acts
and the accused's knowledge of them, and establishing proof of illegal acts
in foreign lands would not be an easy task. On the other hand, an accused
could defend himself presumably by showing that the illegal acts had not
been committed by the foreign third parties, but that would be a difficult
task at best for any accused.
In addition, this mental state-allowing a conviction because the
accused knew the organization had committed terrorist acts-sweeps
together both the guilty and the not guilty.66 It is not against the law to give
to an organization knowing that it has committed illegalities unless that
group has been designated by the Secretary of State.67 And giving to such a
non-designated group is not clearly blameworthy. Assume there is a
charitable day care organization, and some of the group's leaders have
abused their charges. If I give money to this group, knowing of those
misdeeds, but intending to help provide better care for the children, have I
done something wrong? Is it a guilty act to give to the Catholic Church
knowing that members of that organization have engaged in unlawful
activities? An organization can have some members committing terrorist
66 See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 510 (1964). A provision of the Subversive
Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, § 4, 64 Stat. 987, 993-95 (1950) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 785(a)(1)(D) (repealed 1993)), stated that when a Communist
organization was under a final order to register under the Act, it was unlawful for a member with
knowledge or notice of the final order to use a passport. The Act further stated that publication in
the Federal Register of a final order was notice. Id. The Court concluded that under the statute a
member neither had to know of the final order or that she was a member of a "Communist-front"
organization. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 509. Thus, "[t]he provision.., sweeps within its prohibition
both knowing and unknowing members." Id. at 510. The Court then went on to hold that this
indiscriminate lumping of innocent with knowing activity violated due process: "Indiscriminate
classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power." Id.
at 510 (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952)).
67 Cf COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 122 ("[I]t is not a crime to raise and contribute
money for violent conduct abroad that is not otherwise a crime under U.S. law, if carried out by a
group that is not designated by the Secretary .... ").
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acts while the organization as a whole does good works.68  Trying to
advance good works is not blameworthy. It can only be seen as a guilty act
if the donor knows that the organization has been designated and, therefore,
knows that the donation is illegal.69
It may be a guilty act if a person makes a donation intending it to be
used for illegal purposes, or it may be a guilty act if he has knowledge that
the donation would be used for illegal purposes, but it is not a guilty act to
give to a group to further humanitarian, educational, or political goals. It is
only a guilty act under our law if the receiving group has been designated
by the Secretary of State. The Secretary's designation is crucial in
separating a guilty act from an innocent one.7°
6 8Cf Beall, supra note 21, at 701 ("[M]any politically unpopular organizations may be
unnecessarily designated simply because one extreme member, for example, attempted to harm
someone with a firearm.").
69Cf Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994) (holding that the statute's willfulness
provision requires the government to "prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his
conduct was unlawful"). Ratzlafdealt with financial institutions that are required to file reports
with the Secretary of the Treasury whenever they are involved with a cash transaction that
exceeds $10,000. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2000). It is illegal to structure such a transaction into
smaller amounts to avoid the reporting requirement. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3) (2000). "A person
willfully violating" this anti-structuring provision is guilty of a crime. 31 U.S.C. § 5322. The
government had contended that a criminal statute does not require proving that a person violates
the law if the accused's action indicates a wrongful purpose and that structuring a transaction into
less than $10,000 amounts indicates such a wrongful purpose because people would not do it
innocently. Ratzlaf 510 U.S. at 144. The Court, however, concluded that a person might so
structure a transaction to reduce the risk of an IRS audit, because of a fear of burglaries, or to hide
wealth from a former spouse, and these purposes are "not inevitably nefarious." Id. The Court
concluded,
In light of these examples, we are unpersuaded by the argument that
structuring is so obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad' that the 'willfulness'
requirement is satisfied irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the
illegality of structuring. Had Congress wished to dispense with the
requirement, it could have furnished the appropriate instruction.
Id. at 146.
70 See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994) (holding that the crime
of knowingly distributing or receiving sexually explicit images of minors required proving that an
accused knew that the performers were underage). Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated, "[O]ne would reasonably expect to be free from regulation when trafficking in
sexually explicit, though not obscene, materials involving adults. Therefore, the age of the
performers is the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct." Id.
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If § 2339B requires personal guilt, as it should and as the Ninth Circuit
71
suggested is constitutionally necessary, then § 2339B requires that the
donor know that the organization has been designated, not simply that the
donor know of information that might have caused the organization to be
designated.72 The government may contend that this places an unduly
heavy burden on prosecutions obstructing the proper functioning of
§ 2339B, but time and again the Supreme Court in extending a mens rea
requirement to all elements of a variety of crimes has rejected a similar
argument. A jury can infer such knowledge from all the facts and
circumstances.73
71See Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 2003),
vacated by 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18933 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2004). The court held that § 2339B:
[B]y not requiring proof of personal guilt, raises serious Fifth Amendment
due process concerns. But we conclude that there is no need to address those
constitutional concerns because we construe 18 U.S.C. § 2339B to require
proof that a person charged with violating the statute had knowledge of the
organization's designation or knowledge of the unlawful activities that
caused it to be so designated.
Id.
72See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 420 (1985) (quoting the Food Stamp Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 14, 78 Stat. 703, 708 (1964), amended by 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1)
(2000), stating "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses [food stamps] in
any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations" commits a crime). The Court
concluded that "knowingly" extended to all the elements, and, therefore, "the Government must
prove that the defendant knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a manner
unauthorized by statute or regulations." Id. at 433. In Staples v. United States, where the Court
interpreted a statute that made it a crime to possess an unregistered machine gun and concluded
that the government had to prove that the defendant knew the characteristics of his firearm that
brought it within the statutory definition of a machine gun. 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994) (quoting the
Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 14, 78 Stat. 703, 708 (1964), amended by 7
U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (2000)).
73See, e.g., Staples, 511 U.S. at 615-16 n. 11 (citation omitted) ("The Government contends
that... requiring proof of knowledge would place too heavy a burden on the Government and
obstruct the proper functioning of [The National Firearms Act]. But knowledge can be inferred
from circumstantial evidence .. "). See also Liparota, 471 U.S. at 434 ("Nor must the
Government introduce any extraordinary evidence that would conclusively demonstrate
petitioner's state of mind. Rather, as in any other criminal prosecution requiring mens rea, the
Government may prove by reference to facts and circumstances surrounding the case that
petitioner knew that his conduct was unauthorized or illegal."). Cf Jacqueline Benson, Send Me
Your Money: Controlling International Terrorism by Restricting Fundraising in the United States,
21 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 321, 356-57 (1999) (asserting that:
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Section 2339B requires knowledge that the donation is going to an
organization designated by the Secretary of State. Basic principles of
criminal law and normal statutory interpretation lead to that conclusion, but
that does not end the analysis. The Constitution requires that the
prosecution prove something more. The prosecution must establish not
only knowledge, but also that the donor specifically intended for the
donation to further the organization's illegal activities.
V. GOVERNMENTAL INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
A. The Right of Association
The crime of providing material resources to a designated foreign
terrorist organization serves the laudable goal of inhibiting foreign terrorists
from raising money, goods, and personnel in the United States. The law,
however, can be viewed from another angle. It prohibits Americans from
affiliating with others by donating money, goods, and their efforts to
organizations that have, in effect, been outlawed by the decree of a
particular government official. Seen this way, the criminal statute
implicates the constitutional right of association, which, although not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has found
implicitly protected by the First Amendment.74
The right of association can link with the right of free speech to further
the opportunity for the promotion of beliefs and ideas of all stripes. 75 The
Supreme Court has concluded:
[T]he intent requirement may prevent innocent people from being
convicted of supporting terrorists unknowingly. However, it also provides
an easy means of sidestepping the statute. The intent requirement gives
soliciting organizations greater incentive to create false fronts and to lie to
donors. It also gives donors incentive to avoid carefully researching
organizations with questionable backgrounds. Some jurisdictions find the
knowledge requirement satisfied in criminal cases where the defendant is
willfully blind. However, it is premature to assume that the willful blindness
doctrine would be applied to these antiterrorism statutes. Thus, even if the
federal government tries to enforce the statutes, it may be virtually
impossible to produce enough evidence to support a conviction.).
74 See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966) (referring to "the cherished freedom
of association protected by the First Amendment").
75See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981) ("the
right of association [and] the right of expression.., overlap and blend... "); Buckley v. Valeo,
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Effective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than
once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus
between the freedoms of speech and assembly.... Of
course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be
advanced by association pertain to political, economic,
religious or cultural matters.... 76
The right of association, then, is implicated whenever people band
together in pursuit of common goals, whether those aims are political or
not.7 Indeed, the First Amendment goal of open debate can be harmed
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (citations omitted) ("The Court's decisions involving
associational freedoms establish that the right of association is a 'basic constitutional freedom,'
that is 'closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the
foundation of a free society."'). The right of association also has another strand. In this
component, the Supreme Court:
[H]as concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate
human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State
because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom
of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal
liberty.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). Roberts stated that the "creation
and sustenance of' family relationships best exemplifies this right. Id. at 619-20.76 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (citations omitted). See
also Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294 (recognizing that the value of the right of
association "is that by collective effort individuals can make their views known, when,
individually, their voices would be faint or lost").
77See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 338 (Simon & Schuster 2000) (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 190 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 1969)).
Externally, voluntary associations, from churches and professional
societies to Elk clubs and reading groups, allow individuals to express their
interests and demands on government and to protect themselves from abuses
of power by their political leaders. Political information flows through social
networks, and in these networks public life is discussed. As so often,
Tocqueville saw this point clearly: "When some view is represented by an
association, it must take clear and more precise shape. It counts its
supporters and involves them in its cause; these supporters get to know one
another, and numbers increase zeal. An association unites the energies of
divergent minds and vigorously directs them toward a clearly directed goal."
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more when associations for non-political purposes are restricted than when
restrictions are imposed on political associations. If ten of us each have
$100 to spend to advocate for a candidate or ballot measure, our money
may have more impact if pooled than if spent separately, but in elections
many people are usually willing to advocate on the relevant topics and the
chances are good that our viewpoints will still be aired and heard by many
in the relevant audience even if our association is somehow restricted. If,
however, ten of us decide that our part of town would benefit from a new
private hospital, forbidding us from associating may mean that our view
will not reach the relevant audience. Individual $100 expenditures
advocating a new hospital may easily be drowned out in the chatter of
contemporary culture while the coordinated expenditure of $1,000 might be
heard and begin a debate or movement. With the non-political, private
matter an important viewpoint might simply be lost without an association.
The purpose of association, however, is not just limited to advocacy.
The point to protected association is to achieve lawful aims. Just as
advocacy can be enhanced by banding together, so can the accomplishment
of legitimate goals. I may believe that more people ought to make their
clothes available for the homeless. I can speak on the topic. I can join
others with similar thoughts to multiply our voices. But my goal is the
distribution of clothing. I, of course, could act individually to do this; I
could solicit clothing and then find recipients. But my goal will be more
efficiently accomplished if I join together with others to receive clothing
and to distribute it. The right of association protects not just group
advocacy but also associations to advance lawful objectives.78 It makes
When people associate in neighborhood groups, PTAs, political parties,
or even national advocacy groups, their individual and otherwise quiet voices
multiply and are amplified.
Id.
78 Cf Robert K. Vischer, The Good, The Bad and The Ugly: Rethinking the Value of
Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 949, 953 (2004) (concluding that "[t]here has been little
comprehensive effort to identify and classify the paths by which individual participants and the
democratic state derive value from associations and to explore how those paths are implicated in
the adjudication of disputes involving associations"). Vischer identifies core values served by
associations:
First, associations are uniquely capable of carving out a shared identity
that is valued by the individual.... Second, associations provide a voice to
individuals who, absent collective expression, would not be heard above the
din of modem America.... Third, associations empower individuals to
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little sense to say a group of us can come together to argue for a new
hospital, but that we cannot band together to try to build that hospital. If
the Constitution protects one, it protects the other. What is deeply
embedded in our culture is not just group advocacy, but the coming
together to actually accomplish common goals.7 9 As the Supreme Court
has stated in stressing the importance of the right of association, "the
practice of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a
1180common end is deeply embedded in the American political process....
On one level, § 2339B prevents persons sharing common views from
banding together to achieve common ends.
B. Association by Donation
The Supreme Court has not given a comprehensive definition of what
"associates" individuals together to bring their affiliation within the right of
association, but it has indicated that contributions to a group, or at least to a
political organization, are an aspect of that right. Thus, in Buckley v.
Valeo,81 the Court, in considering the limitations in the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 197182 on the amount of money individuals could
contribute to political candidates, stated:
pursue common objectives that would otherwise be beyond their reach, and
that may not be shared by those around them or by the state.. Fourth, any
mediating role played by associations presupposes a degree of autonomy that
is sufficient to allow the association to facilitate shared meaning among its
members.
Id. at 1019-20.
79 The Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees stated that:
[A] broad range of human relationships... may make greater or lesser
claims to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the State.
Determining the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to
enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful
assessment of where that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a
spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal
attachments.
468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
80 Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294.
" 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
82 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 et. seq. (West Supp. 2004)).
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[T]he Act's contribution and expenditure
limitations ... impinge on protected associational
freedoms. Making a contribution, like joining a political
party, serves to affiliate a person with a candidate. In
addition, it enables like-minded persons to pool their
resources in furtherance of common political goals....
... [T]he primary First Amendment problem raised by the
Act's contribution limitations is their restriction of one
aspect of the contributor's freedom of political
association.
83
Contributing to a political campaign is an act of affiliation that
implicates the right of association, but because the right of association
protects banding together not just to advance political beliefs but any kind
of belief,84 contributing resources to any organization is an act of affiliation
with that group implicating the right of association.85
3Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22-24. The Court also stated, "[Tihe present Act's
contribution ... limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and
association by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties .. " Id. at 18.
84See supra text accompanying note 77.
85At issue in Buckley were monetary donations. 424 U.S. at 7. Section 2339B, however,
makes it illegal to provide not only financial resources to a designated foreign terrorist
organization, but also "lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or
religious materials." 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4) (2000) (incorporating the definition of "material
support or resources" from 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(a) (West Supp. 2004)). The right of association,
however, does not disappear because resources other than money are provided. When I provide
lodging to an official in town on NAACP business, I am associating with the NAACP. When I
lend public address equipment to a union for a rally, I am affiliating with that union. When I run a
jobs workshop at a homeless organization, I am allying myself with the homeless organization.
Indeed, such actions may bring me into a closer connection with the groups than merely
impersonally donating the money for a hotel room, a bullhorn rental, or the hiring of someone else
to lecture about how to interview. These are acts that bring the right of association into play just as
does the mere donation of money, and being prosecuted for them impinges on that constitutional
right.
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C. The Framework for Assessing Impingements on the Right of
Association
The Court has acknowledged that the right of association is not
absolute, 6 but it has been unclear about the proper standard for measuring
whether an impingement on that right is constitutional. A half-century ago,
the Supreme Court indicated that strict, or even higher, scrutiny must be
applied whenever the state infringed on the right of association, regardless
of whether the association had political or other aims: "[I]t is immaterial
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to
political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the
closest scrutiny. 87 However, the Court has also indicated that the level of
constitutional protection for the right of association varies with the kind of
association at issue,88 and while nodding in the direction of a strict scrutiny
standard,89 has said that even government regulation that significantly
interferes with association for political purposes "may be sustained if the
State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedoms." 90 Most recently, in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
the Court stated that even a significant interference with the right to
association does not normally require strict scrutiny but is "valid if it
satisfies the 'lesser demand' of being "'closely drawn"' to match a
'sufficiently important interest." 91
86See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) ("The right to
associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements on that right may be
justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms.").
8TNAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618 ("[T]he nature and degree of constitutional protection
afforded freedom of association may vary depending on the extent to which one or the other
aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case.").
89 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 ("In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate,
governmental 'action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to
the closest scrutiny."') (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460-61).
9°Id.
9'124 S. Ct. 619, 656 (2003) (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200,
2210-11 (2003). McConnell also stated that "a particular piece of campaign-finance regulation
may at times be so severe as to warrant strict scrutiny[,]" but that the law before the Court did
"not present such a case." Id. at 659 n.43.
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The level of examination does not change even when an association is
prohibited, not merely limited. According to Federal Election Commission
v. Beaumont:
[T]he degree of scrutiny turns on the nature of the activity
regulated.... It is not that the difference between a ban
and a limit is to be ignored; it is just that the time to
consider it is when applying scrutiny at the level selected,
not in selecting the standard of review itself.92
On the other hand, McConnell indicates that even if the same
constitutional standard applies to both contribution bans and restrictions, a
complete prohibition on contributions could more easily run afoul of the
constitution than a limitation. The Court stated that political parties, and
also presumably people, give money to an organization for a number of
reasons, "not the least of which is to associate themselves with certain
causes and, in so doing, to demonstrate the values espoused by the party. A
complete ban on donations prevents parties from making even the 'general
expression of support' that a contribution represents. 93
Therefore, in determining whether a right of association has been
unconstitutionally infringed, the first step is to assess the importance of the
kind of association at stake. Second, the governmental interest that is
sought to be furthered by the regulations impinging on the association must
be weighed. Third, if that governmental interest is sufficient to restrict or
prohibit the kind of association at issue, the impinging regulations must be
examined to see if they are precisely drawn so as to affect the right of
association no more than is necessary to accomplish the governmental goal.
The Court has refined and applied this standard in a series of cases
limiting or prohibiting campaign contributions. The Court held, as we have
seen, that such donations are acts of affiliations implicating the right of
association. That kind of association, the Court indicated, is due the highest
protection, because First Amendment guarantees are at their strongest when
elections are at issue. Buckley itself noted:
92123 S. Ct. 2200, 2211 (2003). See also id. at 2210 ("[T]he basic premise we have followed
in setting First Amendment standards for reviewing financial restrictions [is that] the level of
scrutiny is based on the importance of the 'political activity at issue' to effective speech or
political association.").
93 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 681 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).
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In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of
the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates
for office is essential, for the identities of those who are
elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a
nation .... '[I]t can hardly be doubted that the
constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for
political office.'
94
Even though the kind of association at issue was of the most important,
Buckley v. Valeo found that the law limiting contributions to candidates
served a compelling enough interest to limit association.95 This interest is
"the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by
the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on
candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office., 9 6 Buckley
found the campaign law to be constitutional partly because the law was
drawn narrowly enough so that it only marginally restricted First
Amendment rights.97 A contribution does indicate support for the
candidate, but:
The quantity of communication by the contributor does not
increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since
the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated,
symbolic act of contributing.... A limitation on the
amount of money a person may give to a candidate or
campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint
on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic
expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does
not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to
discuss candidates and issues.98
Not every government interest, however, even if it is offered to support
a better governing process, is sufficient to abridge associational rights, as
the Court made clear in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley.99
The city of Berkeley had placed a limit of $250 on contributions to
94424 U.S. at 14-15 (citation omitted).
95 1d. at 29.96 1d. at 25.
971d at 21.
981d.
99454 U.S. 290 (1981).
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committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures. 100 The Court
stated that "the practice of persons.. . banding together to achieve a
common end is deeply embedded in the American process,"'01 is protected
by the First Amendment's right of association, and its regulation "is always
subject to exacting judicial review."' 1 2  The limitation on contributions
infringed this right, 0 3 an infringement that could not be justified under
Buckley. The Court stated, "Buckley identified a single narrow exception to
the rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the First
Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of undue influence of
large contributors to a candidate .... ,104 The rationale that allowed the
impingements on association in Buckley did not apply to committees to
advocate for or against ballot measures. The City of Berkeley responded
that the contribution limitations were also "necessary as a prophylactic
measure to make known the identity of supporters and opponents of ballot
measures."' 1 5 The Court indicated that this might be a valuable goal, but
that a provision of the ordinance separate from the contribution limits
required publication of contributor's names before the vote and concluded
that the identified interest of the limits was insubstantial since voters could
identify the contributors under the other provisions. The Court concluded,
"It is clear, therefore, that [the contribution limit] does not advance a
legitimate governmental interest significant enough to justify its
infringement of First Amendment rights."'' 0 6  The regulation did not
promote a strong enough interest; therefore, the Court held, "The restraint
imposed by the Berkeley ordinance on rights of association and in turn on
'°°Id. at 292.
"
1 Id. at 294.
102 a
1
0 3 The Court stated:
To place a Spartan limit--or indeed any limit--on individuals wishing to band
together to advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none on
individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association. [The
limit on contributions] does not seek to mute the voice of one individual, and
it cannot be allowed to hobble the collective expressions of a group.
Id. at 296.
"°Id. at 296-97.
'° Id. at 298.
"I6 !d. at 299.
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individual and collective rights of expression plainly contravenes both the
right of association and the speech guarantees of the First Amendment."10 7
D. The Associational Interests to Be Balanced in a Section 2339B
Prosecution
The campaign contribution cases, while providing an application of the
framework to be used in determining whether a § 2339B prosecution
infringes the right of association, do not indicate how the constitutional
question concerning that crime should be resolved. On the one hand, the
kind of association at issue in the campaign cases is of the highest
constitutional importance. Surely associating with a foreign organization is
not as central to First Amendment concerns as are affiliations for the
purposes of a political election, and, therefore, it would seem easier to
impinge constitutionally on associations with foreign organizations than on
affiliations with political candidates and parties.
On the other hand, the goals of the upheld campaign contribution limits
were to promote central concerns of our governmental system. The
country's foundations are corrupted without honest elections and
government, and without trust in governmental and electoral honesty.
Association for electoral politics may be at the core of the First
Amendment, but honest elections and the appearance of honest elections
are at the core of our whole government. This state interest is strong
enough to allow impingement on the right of association to limit large
political donations that could corrupt or give the appearance of corrupting
political candidates.
The governmental interest furthered by § 2339B is the prevention of
terrorism in foreign lands. This is an important goal, but there is little in the
Court's association cases about whether it is of sufficiently significant rank
to prohibit a right of association. While it is easy without reflection to
assume that the prevention of foreign terrorism is a goal of the highest
order, 10 8 in an important way the interest does not approach the one
identified in Buckley. The country's foundations are destroyed without
'
7 Id. at 300. The Court added, "A limit on contributions in this setting need not be analyzed
exclusively in terms of the right of association or the right of expression. The two rights overlap
and blend; to limit the right of association places an impermissible restraint on the right of
expression." Id.
l°8See, e.g., Boim v. Quaranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000, 1027 (7th
Cir. 2002) (concluding that "we conclude that the government's interest in preventing terrorism is
not only important but paramount").
2004]
BA YLOR LA W REVIEW
honest elections and government, and trust in that honesty, while those
foundations are not directly touched by terrorism abroad.
Compared to the political contribution cases, the § 2339B scales have
less weighty concerns on each side, and the Supreme Court decisions about
the campaign restrictions reveal little about how the § 2339B balancing
should be done. At most, perhaps, it can be concluded that with less
momentous interests filling each balance pan, the government should be
able to impinge on the right to associate with foreign organizations for the
purpose of preventing foreign terrorism. If so, then the issue is whether
§ 2339B's scheme is closely drawn so as to infringe associational rights no
more than necessary to accomplish the law's goal. 10 9
Here again, the campaign cases give little guidance. Buckley, for
example, upheld an impingement on the right of association, but that
impingement was only a limitation on the right, not a prohibition on
1°9See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968). O'Brien was convicted of
destroying his draft card when he burned it to protest the Vietnam War and the draft. Id. at 369-
70. The Court stated that even if the destruction was symbolic speech, it did not necessarily
follow that the First Amendment protected the speech. Id. at 382. Furthermore, the Court
recognized "that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376. The Court reviewed
various terms used to define what the necessary governmental interest could be and stated:
Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
Id. at 377. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (concluding that restrictions on
campaign contributions were different from the conduct regulated in O'Brien:
We cannot share the view that the present Act's
contribution... limitations are comparable to the restriction on conduct
upheld in O'Brien. The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated
with such conduct as the destruction of a draft card. Some forms of
communication made possible by the giving and spending of money involve
speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a
combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the
dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates
itself.. .to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.).
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association. An individual could associate with a candidate by giving
money; only the amount of money was limited. Section 2339B, however,
does not just restrict the amount of donated resources; it prohibits them no
matter what the size. Unlike Buckley, this is not a mere limit on the extent
of an association, but a ban of certain associations, a much greater intrusion
into First Amendment rights.
Furthermore, limiting contributions to a candidate does not prohibit
other effective methods for advancing the donor's goals. He can speak out
directly about the candidate or the ideas the candidate stands for, or give to
other groups who advance those ideas. The donor to a designated foreign
terrorist organization may wish to advance the welfare of people he
believes are oppressed by supporting schools and orphanages where they
live. That designated organization may be the only effective one in the
affected region undertaking such activities. If donations are banned, the
donor may have no other way to accomplish his worthwhile goals.
The campaign contribution cases give little guidance as to what might
constitute acceptable, closely drawn, governmental regulations that would
allow the constitutional impingement on association with groups like the
designated organizations that have both legal and illegal goals. In another
line of cases explicating the right of association, however, the Supreme
Court has directly addressed that issue. Indeed, those cases concerned
organizations that were once viewed by many government officials as the
equivalent of terrorists, the Communist Party and civil rights groups.
VI. THE SPECIFIC INTENT REQUIRED BY THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
Junius Scales, a member of the Communist Party, was convicted for
violating the membership provision of the Smith Act.' 10 Under the Smith
Act, it was a crime to organize a group to teach, advocate, or encourage the
overthrow of any government in the United States, and the Act made it a
crime for anyone who "bec[ame] or [wals a member of, or affiliate[d] with,
any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes
thereof... ."1' Scales contended that the membership and affiliation
provision violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment "in that
it impermissibly imputes guilt to an individual merely on the basis of his
associations and sympathies, rather than because of some concrete personal
"° Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 205 (1961).
"'18 U.S.C § 2385 (2000). See Scales, 367 U.S. at 205 n.l.
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involvement in criminal conduct; and ... in that it infringes on free political
expression and association."'' 
2
The Court stated that, as the doctrines of conspiracy and complicity
demonstrate, associational relationships can be criminal." 3 However, the
Court also indicated that criminalizing membership in organizations with a
criminal purpose can infringe constitutional freedoms." 4 A membership
may only indicate a sympathy to an organization's goals without any
significant act advancing the group's criminality:
[A] person who merely becomes a member of an illegal
organization, by that 'act' alone need be doing nothing
more than signifying his assent to its purposes and
activities on one hand, and providing, on the other, only the
sort of moral encouragement which comes from the
knowledge that others believe in what the organization is
doing.... A member, as distinguished from a conspirator,
may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by the
very fact of his membership without thereby necessarily
committing himself to further it by any act or course of
conduct whatever." 15
The Court concluded that prohibiting membership in an organization
whose goals are not solely criminal would violate the First Amendment.
It is, of course, true that quasi-political parties or other
groups that may embrace both legal and illegal aims differ
from a technical conspiracy, which is defined by its
criminal purpose, so that all knowing association with the
conspiracy is a proper subject for criminal proscription as
far as First Amendment liberties are concerned. If there
were a similar blanket prohibition of association with a
group having both legal and illegal aims, there would
indeed be a real danger that legitimate political expression
or association would be impaired...." 6
12Scales, 367 U.S. at 220.
"'31d. at 225.
14Id. at 227.
15 Id. at 227-28.
116Id. at 229 (emphasis in original).
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The Court solved these constitutional dilemmas by reading into the
statute knowledge, conduct, and intent provisions that were not explicitly
there. In order to convict a donor, the government must prove that the
donor had knowledge of the group's illegal aims;' 17 be an "active" member
of the organization; and specifically intend to accomplish its illegal
purposes. 18 The Court concluded:
When the statute is found to reach only "active" members
having also a guilty knowledge and intent, [it] therefore
prevents a conviction on what otherwise might be regarded
as merely an expression of sympathy with the alleged
criminal enterprise, unaccompanied by any significant
action in its support or any commitment to undertake such
action. 19
The Court stressed the importance of the requirement that the accused have
the intent to further the organization's illegal aims. "[T]he member for
whom the organization is a vehicle for the advancement of legitimate aims
and policies does not fall within the ban of the statute: he lacks the requisite
,,120
specific intent....
"
7 Id. at 229. The Court stated:
If it is said that the mere existence of [the membership] enactment tends
to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, in that it engenders
an unhealthy fear that one may find himself unwittingly embroiled in
criminal liability, the answer surely is that the statute provides that a
defendant must be proven to have knowledge of the proscribed advocacy
before he may be convicted.
Id.
U.in Noto v. United States, another prosecution under the Smith Act membership clause, the
Court stated a specific intent is required:
[Flor otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with legitimate aims
of such an organization, but not specifically intending to accomplish them by
resort to violence, might be punished for his adherence to lawful and
constitutionally protected purposes, because of other and unprotected
purposes which he does not necessarily share.
367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961).
"9 Scales, 367 U.S. at 228.
"O°d. at 229-30.
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Scales did not expressly say that the freedom of association required the
specific intent that the Court read into the Smith Act, but Elfbrandt v.
Russell, decided five years later, did.' 21 The State of Arizona had required
state employees to take a loyalty oath and specifically provided that anyone
taking the oath who was a knowing member of the Communist party or a
related organization committed perjury. 22  The Supreme Court stated,
"This Act threatens the cherished freedom of association protected by the
First Amendment .... ,, The Court noted that members of groups who do
not agree with and do not participate in a group's illegal goals are not a
danger and held that "[a] law which applies to membership without the
'specific intent' to further the illegal aims of the organization infringes
unnecessarily on protected freedoms."'
' 24
The year following Elfbrandt, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Robel125 held that the portion of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950 that prohibited a member of certain Communist organizations from
working in any defense facility violated the right to freedom of
association.126 The Court stated that this provision could not be limited by
statutory interpretation to active members who have the specific intent of
furthering the illegal goals of the organization, and it, therefore, applied to
all categories of membership. 27 Robel concluded:
It is precisely because that statute sweeps indiscriminately
across all types of association with Communist-action
groups, without regard to the quality and degree of
membership, that it runs afoul of the First Amendment....
121384 U.S. 11 (1966).
1221 Id. at 13 n.2.
12 3 Id. at 18.
1
24 Id. at 19.
125389 U.S. 258, 266 (1967).
126See Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, § 4, 64 Stat. 987, 991-92
(1950) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (repealed 1993)).
12 7 The Court noted that while Scales had read such limitations into the membership clause of
the Smith Act, the Smith Act required an accused to have knowledge of the organization's illegal
aims, a requirement that allowed the Court to limit that statute to active members who had the
specific intent to further the organization's illegalities. Robel, 389 U.S. at 262. A similar
knowledge requirement was not in the Subversive Activities Control Act. Id.
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[T]he operative fact upon which the job disability
depends is the exercise of an individual's right of
association, which is protected by provisions of the First
Amendment.1
28
The Court noted that precision of regulation is required for government
restrictions of First Amendment rights, 129 and the challenged provision
"contains the fatal defect of overbreadth because it seeks to bar
employment for both association which may be proscribed and for
association which may not be proscribed consistently with First
Amendment rights."
30
The Court in Scales, Elfbrandt, and Robel indicated that the government
can place burdens on membership in a group with both legal and illegal
goals only if the government establishes that the member was active in the
organization and had the specific intent to further the group's illegal goals.
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. extended that doctrine to affiliations
other than formal memberships.' 3 '
Claiborne Hardware arose out of a civil rights boycott. In spring of
1966, a petition seeking equal rights and opportunities for blacks in
Claiborne County, Mississippi, was presented to a meeting held by the local
branch of the NAACP where it was unanimously approved by 500
people. 132 When the local officials did not accede to the requests, several
hundred people attended another meeting and unanimously agreed to
boycott the county's white merchants until the petition was satisfied, a
boycott that continued for years.' 33 While most actions to further the
boycott-meetings, speeches, picketing, demonstrations, the recording and
reporting of boycott violators-were legal and peaceful, a few violent acts
occurred for the purpose of intimidating some from trading with the white
merchants. 
34
The merchants sued the NAACP, another organization, and 146
individuals for damages resulting from the boycott. 135 A state chancellor in
equity found 130 individuals and the NAACP jointly and severally liable
128 Id. at 262-63.
1291d. at 265 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
'
3
°Id. at 266.
1'458 U.S. 886 (1982).
132 Id. at 899.
'
33 Id. at 889.
134 Id. at 902-06.
3
' Id. at 889.
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for the merchants' lost earnings and good will, entered a judgment of over
$1.2 million, and issued an injunction.1 36 The Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment against ninety people and the NAACP, concluding
that the entire boycott was illegal because "[i]n carrying out the agreement
and design, certain of the defendants, acting for all others," engaged in
violence, physical force, and threats to further the boycott.
137
The individuals were not found liable for mere membership in the
NAACP or any other organization that had supported the boycott. Instead,
they were held liable for their acts that effectuated the boycott. 138  The
merchants divided the actions justifying liability into three groups. The
first group was the management of the boycott as evidenced by regular
attendance at weekly NAACP meetings and by taking leadership roles at
the meetings. 139  The second group consisted of boycott enforcers who
stood outside the stores and noted individuals who traded with the white
merchants so that the boycott breakers' names could be publicized. 140 The
third group consisted of those who committed or threatened acts of violence
to further the boycott.
141
The Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment protected the
defendants' right to band together to express their views collectively, 42 but
that the violent activities were not constitutionally protected by the First
Amendment, 43 and those who committed the violence could be held liable
for the losses resulting from the violence. 44  The boycott, then, was an
136 Id. at 893.
137Id. at 894, 897.
'I1d. at 897.
1391d.
140 id.
1411d.
142Id. at 907-08. The Court stated:
As we so recently acknowledged in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294, 'the practice of persons sharing common views
banding together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the
American political process.' We recognized that 'by collective effort
individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their voices
would be faint or lost.'
Id.
143Id. at 916. (stating that "The First Amendment does not protect violence.").
144Id. at 918. Their liability, however, did not extend to all the losses resulting from the
boycott. "While the State legitimately may impose damages for the consequences of violent
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association where many members undertook legitimate, constitutionally-
protected activities to further the boycott's aim, while some members
committed crimes to advance those purposes. That some members acted
violently, however, did not destroy the protected right of association for
everyone, as the Mississippi Supreme Court had determined. The Supreme
Court concluded, "The right to associate does not lose all constitutional
protection merely because some members of the group may have
participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected."' 145
On the other hand, the Court continued, "[t]he presence of protected
activity... does not end the relevant constitutional inquiry.' ' 146 However,
if liability is to be legitimately imposed for constitutionally unprotected
conduct occurring "in the context of constitutionally protected activity ....
'precision of regulation' is demanded."'' 47 After reviewing Scales and the
right of association cases it spawned, the Court held:
Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an
individual belonged to a group, some members of which
committed acts of violence. For liability to be imposed by
reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that
the group itself possessed unlawful goals and that the
individual held a specific intent to further those illegal
aims. 14
8
The crime of providing material resources to a designated foreign
terrorist organization does not penalize anyone for being a member of such
an organization; instead, it criminalizes the act of providing material
support or resources to such a group. As Claiborne Hardware concluded,
however, the right of association protects more than just membership in an
organization. "Association" is a broader term than "membership." One can
associate with a group in more ways than just joining its formal
membership rolls. Claiborne Hardware teaches that the First Amendment
conduct, it may not award compensation for the consequences of nonviolent, protected activity.
Only those losses proximately caused by unlawful conduct may be recovered." Id.
145 Id. at 908.
146Id. at 912. The Court noted economic regulations that have had incidental effects on First
Amendment rights had been constitutionally sustained, but, the Court continued, a state's power
"to regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent,
politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change to effectuate
rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself." Id. at 914.
14 7 Id. at 916.
148 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920.
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protects all forms of association with a group, and other Supreme Court
cases establish that people have the right to associate with a group by
donating their money, services, or goods. 
149
That right is not absolute, but it can be infringed only if the government
regulation serves important and legitimate state interests and is closely
drawn so as to not impinge on associational freedom more than is necessary
to effectuate that legitimate interest. When the association is with an
organization that has both legal and illegal goals or methods, the necessary
precision of regulation requires that an act of association can be
constitutionally criminalized only if it is shown that the act was done with
the specific intent to further the group's illegal aims or methods. The
Supreme Court's right of association cases, thus, demonstrate that a person
can be validly prosecuted for providing material resources to a designated
foreign terrorist organization only if it is shown that the provision was made
with the specific intent of furthering the designated organization's illegal
goals or methods.
So far the Supreme Court has not interpreted § 2339B, but the lower
courts have refused to follow these right of association cases and have not
found that the Constitution requires that specific intent.
VII. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 2339B AND THE RIGHT
OF ASSOCIATION
The major interpretation of the interplay between the constitutional right
of association and § 2339B concerned the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), organizations designated
as terrorist by the Secretary of State but also groups, as we have seen, that
sought to advance important, legitimate goals.' 50 American supporters of
the PKK 151 and the LTTE 152 contended that they wished to give what they
149 See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 142 ("But if the right to associate does not include
the right to pay dues, raise money, or provide any material support to one's group of choice, the
right is an empty formalism. Association cannot exist without the material support of their
members.").
150 See supra note 76.
15 The Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), a non-profit organization headquartered in Los
Angeles, a consultant to the United Nations (UN) and a regular participant with the UN
Commission on Human Rights that "works for the peaceful resolution of armed conflict" through,
among other activities, fact-finding missions and reports, and Ralph Fertig, a federal
administrative judge who was President of the HLP's Board of Directors and an active participant
in HLP activities around the world, said that they wished to continue aid, begun in 1991, to the
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feared would be considered material support to these groups in violation of
§ 2339B and sought an injunction barring enforcement of the act against
them.
The first time this case made it to the Ninth Circuit, Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno, 5 3 the court brushed off the contention that the right of
PKK. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affid, 205
F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Dep't of Justice,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18933 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2004). Although they had supported the PKK
before the designation, HLP and Fertig said that because the Secretary of State had designated the
PKK a foreign terrorist organization HLP & Fertig had been deterred by the possibility of
violating the criminal law from aiding the PKK's nonviolent humanitarian and political activities.
They alleged that they would have liked to, but were deterred from, providing support in the
following ways:
(1) solicit funds for, and make cash contributions to the PKK's political
branch, for its lawful political work on behalf of the Kurds' human rights and
for humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish refugees;
(2) advocate on PKK's behalf before the UN Commission on Human Rights
and the United States Congress;
(3) train the PKK in how to engage in political advocacy and on how to use
international law to seek redress for human rights violations;
(4) write and distribute publications supportive of the PKK and the cause of
Kurdish liberation;
(5) advocate for the freedom of Turkish political prisoners convicted of
being PKK members or supporters;
(6) work with PKK members at peace conferences and other meetings
toward the cause of peace and justice for the Kurds; and
(7) provide lodging to PKK members in connection with these activities.
Id. at 1182.
152 Four membership organizations and an individual said they sought to give aid to the
LTTE. One group said it wished to offer its expert medical and health care advice and assistance
to the designated terrorist organization. Another group claimed expertise in politics, law, and
economic development which it sought to offer the LTTE for the purpose of achieving normalcy
in a war-torn land. A third sought to develop school curricula and rebuild libraries in the areas
controlled by the LTTE. A fourth group sought to offer expert economic development and
information technology expertise to promote civil peace in the lives of Tamils. The individual
was a doctor who had visited hospitals run by the LTTE and wished to return giving medical
advice and offering his services for a six month period or more. Humanitarian Law Project v.
Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1190-92 (C.D. Cal. 2004), vacated by Humanitarian Law Project
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18933 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2004).
'-"205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
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association cases culminating in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 54
controlled: "Claiborne Hardware and similar cases address situations
where people are punished 'by reason of association alone' .. . in other
words, merely for membership in a group or for espousing its views. 155
The court continued that § 2339B criminalizes neither membership nor
advocacy; instead, it "prohibits ... the act of giving material support, and
there is no constitutional right to facilitate terrorism by giving terrorists the
weapons and explosives with which to carry out their grisly missions. Nor,
of course, is there a right to provide resources with which terrorists can buy
weapons and explosives.'
156
The court concluded that the statutory scheme "was well enough
tailored" so as not to infringe the First Amendment.157 The government has
a substantial legitimate interest in preventing international terrorism, and
the political branches, because of foreign policy concerns, have great
leeway in determining how best to fight international terrorism, including
the determination that any donation to a designated organization aids
terrorism. 58 The court concluded:
[A]ll material support given to such organizations aids their
unlawful goals.... [M]oney is fungible; giving support
intended to aid an organization's peaceful activities frees
up resources that can be used for terrorist acts. We will not
indulge in speculation about whether Congress was right to
come to the conclusion that it did. We simply note that
Congress has the fact-finding resources to properly come to
such a conclusion. Thus, we cannot say that [§ 2339B] is
not sufficiently tailored. 59
The Ninth Circuit's underlying premise was that because a donor cannot
control the use to which his aid will be put, any donation to a designated
organization can further terrorism. 60 Consequently, the First Amendment
15458 U.S. 886 (1982).
155Humanitarian, 205 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920).
1561d.
5 71d. at 1136.
'"
5 See id. ("Because the judgment of how best to achieve that end is strongly bound up with
foreign policy considerations, we must allow the political branches wide latitude in selecting the
means to bring about the desired goal.").
159id.
16'See id. at 1134 ("Material support given to a terrorist organization can be used to promote
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does not require "the government to demonstrate a specific intent to aid an
organization's illegal activities before attaching liability to the donation of
funds."
161
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno consequently concluded that it did
not violate the Constitution to make all monetary contributions or other
donations to a designated foreign terrorist organization criminal.162 The
intent of the donor does not matter. Even if the contributor intends the
money to be used for advocacy, political organizing, or schooling, the
donation is a crime if it is given to an organization designated by the
Secretary of State.
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning, however, misread the Supreme Court
cases. The court of appeals found in Claiborne Hardware and related
decisions an act-versus-mere-membership distinction for the right of
association. The Supreme Court cases, in this view, were concerned with
punishment "merely for membership in a group or for espousing its
views .... What (§ 2339B) prohibits is the act of giving material
support ....1 63  In this view, the right of association protects against
liability for membership in an organization, but not against liability for
actions.
That action-membership distinction fails for a number of reasons. First,
organizational membership does not occur passively. Except for
memberships resulting from birth, it takes some sort of act to become a
member of a group. No one is a mere member of an organization;
membership requires action.' 64
Furthermore, Claiborne Hardware did not impose a specific intent
requirement to protect mere membership or the espousal of group's views,
as the Ninth Circuit put it. Instead, the specific intent was required by the
Supreme Court to protect "association." "Association" includes
"membership," but "association" is the broader term. A person can be
constitutionally protected in associating or affiliating with a group without
the organization's unlawful activities, regardless of donor intent. Once the support is given, the
donor has no control over how it is used.").
161 id.
162 Id. at 1136.
163/d. at 1133 (emphasis added) (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920).
'64 Cf Cole, supra note 2, at 11 ("[T]he distinction between association and material support
is illusory. Groups cannot exist without the material support of their members and associates. If
the right of association meant only that one had the right to join organizations but not to support
them, the right would be empty.").
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being a formal member of it. As the political contribution cases indicate, a
person can associate with a political candidate within the protections of the
First Amendment without somehow being a "member" of the candidate.
Indeed, Claiborne Hardware makes quite clear that the right of association
protects more than mere membership and espousal of a group's views.
The association at issue in Claiborne Hardware was not some sort of
formal organizational membership, but an association that came through the
acts of individuals that allied themselves with an ad hoc group. Mississippi
had not imposed liability for membership in the NAACP or some other
organization but for acts that had furthered the boycott.165 The Supreme
Court's dispositions, however, indicated that taking actions to further the
boycott did not remove the individual from the constitutional protection of
the right of association.' 66  Thus, Mississippi justified liability on some
because they acted as "store watchers" recording names of shoppers with
some of the watchers wearing distinctive clothes, apparently to intimidate
people from entering the stores. The Court held that these acts in
furtherance of the boycott were insufficient to impose liability for the
illegal conduct without a showing of the requisite specific intent.1 67 The
Court stated:
There is nothing unlawful in standing outside a store and
recording names. Similarly, there is nothing unlawful in
wearing black hats, although such apparel may cause
apprehension in others .... [M]ere association with either
group-absent a specific intent to further an unlawful aim
embraced by that group-is insufficient predicate for
liability.
68
When it discussed the possible liability for the boycott's main leader, the
Court explicitly stated that "liability may not be imposed ... [for] active
participation in the boycott itself."' 169 Claiborne Hardware indicates that
r'SNAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 921 (1982).
1
66 Id. at 908-15.
16 7 Id. at 925-26.
161Id. The Court also held that liability could not be imposed for attendance at the meetings
where the boycott was a topic but illegal conduct was not authorized, ratified, or discussed. Id. at
924-25. The Court stated, "To impose liability for presence at weekly meetings of the NAACP
would--ironically--not even constitute 'guilt by association,' since there is no evidence that the
association possessed unlawful aims. Rather, liability could only be imposed on a 'guilt for
association' theory. Neither is permissible under the First Amendment." Id. at 925.
169 1d. at 926. The Court did say that Charles Evers might be held liable for illegalities of
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the right of association protects not just mere membership or espousal of
views, but also actions that associate.
This right of association, however, is not absolute. The government can
impinge on that right when it furthers a legitimate state goal and does so
without unnecessarily abridging the right through precise regulations or
closely drawn means. 170 The Ninth Circuit did conclude that § 2339B was
"well enough tailored" to avoid First Amendment problems. 171  Such
tailoring did not require proof of a specific intent to further an
organization's terrorism because a donor cannot control how the money is
used after it is given. It could be given with the intent to aid humanitarian
or advocacy purposes, but still be used for violence. Because all money is
fungible, Congress could prohibit all donations to a designated
organization.1
72
others if "he authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious activity [of others].... [A] finding
that his public speeches were likely to incite lawless action could justify holding him liable for
unlawful conduct that in fact followed within a reasonable period," or "the speeches might be
taken as evidence that Evers gave other specific instructions to carry out violent acts or threats."
Id. at 927.
'
7
°Cf Vischer, supra note 78, at 1007-08.
[Flor a society that values a vibrant associational life, checking the perceived
excesses of certain associations is a course better left to the marketplace of
associations (and individuals acting outside associations) rather than the
trump of government dictates. Limiting government intervention to
instances where an association threatens harm to nonmembers or
nonconsenting members is one such avenue.
Id.
17 1Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated by
Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Dep't of Justice, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18933 (9th
Cir. Sept. 8, 2004).
172 Cf Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of Terrorism and
Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341, 1414-15 (2004).
On a practical level, it is unlikely that an innocent, reasonable Muslim giving
obligatory zakat, for example, or another well-intentioned reasonable donor
making a donation to his or her place of worship, to a humanitarian relief
organization, or to any other seemingly legitimate charitable organization
would consider, first, the notion that money is fungible, and second, the
prospect that his or her altruism might assist a foreign terrorist group.
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Section 2339B, however, prohibits not just fungible money, but also
goods and services. The Ninth Circuit concluded that such non-fingible
donations could also be completely prohibited for much the same reasons as
money: "Congress explicitly incorporated a finding into the statute that
'foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates
that conduct.' .. . It follows that all material support given to such
organizations aids their unlawful goals."'17 3  Consequently, because all
donations can be used by an organization for terrorism no matter what
intent prompted the donation, a scheme prohibiting all donations is
"sufficiently tailored." 174
This reasoning may have some power, but it still does not explain why
Scales and the related associational rights cases do not control. Certainly
§ 2339B cannot be distinguished from the Supreme Court cases over the
importance of the governmental goal. The government may have a
substantial interest in preventing international terrorism, but the interest at
stake in the cases concerning the Communist Party was even higher-the
prevention of the violent overthrow of government. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine a more important interest a representative government can have
than the prevention of its forceful destruction.175
Section 2339B involves foreign policy. HLP I noted that this is an area
where the courts have extended the political branches special deference,1 76
but that foreign policy concerns are at issue does not distinguish Scales and
its progeny. Thus, at issue in United States v. Robe1177 was a portion of the
173Humanitarian, 205 F.3d at 1136 (citing Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996)).
1741d.
175 See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 154.
But the principle prohibiting guilt by association was developed in the
crucible of a battle against what appeared to be an even more formidable foe-
-the Communist Party, an organization that Congress found to be, and the
Supreme Court accepted as, a foreign-dominated organization that used
sabotage and terrorism for the purpose of overthrowing the United States by
force and violence. If association with such an organization deserves
protection, surely association with much less powerful groups that have
threatened or used some violence at some point deserves similar protection.
Id.
176 See supra note 158.
177389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 that prohibited members of
various Communist-action groups from working in any defense facility.17
The Court held that because this provision was not limited to active
members who have the specific intent of furthering the illegal goals of the
selected organization, the Act violated the First Amendment right of
association.79 The Court reached this conclusion even though the statute
was passed pursuant to congressional war powers. The Court
acknowledged that the judiciary has given broad discretion to legislation
adopted under these powers but added:
However, the phrase "war power" cannot be invoked as a
talismanic incantation to support any exercise of
congressional power which can be brought within its
ambit.... Implicit in the term "national defense" is the
notion of defending those values and ideals which set this
Nation apart.... It would indeed be ironic if, in the name
of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of
one of those liberties--the freedom of association--which
makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile. 18 0
If war powers do not justify the elimination of the specific intent
requirement necessary to protect the right of association, it should not
disappear merely because of the invocation of foreign affairs.
Finally, of course, the Ninth Circuit upheld the law because a group
with terrorist and other goals could use any donation to enhance its
terrorism. This logic does not distinguish Scales and its progeny. Instead,
it confronts the issue from a perspective not used by the Supreme Court.
The Ninth Circuit's focus is on how the organization could use the
donation, not on the mental state of the donor. Consequently, according to
the Court of Appeals, if the organization could use the donation corruptly,
the donation, even though an act of association that otherwise would be
protected by the First Amendment, can be criminalized even if the donor
had no intent to further terrorism. In contrast, the Supreme Court's focus in
Scales and the related cases is on the activities and mental states of the
associating individual not on how an organization with both legal and
illegal aims might further its illegalities from an act of association.
17 Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, § 4, 64 Stat. 987, 993-95
(1950) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 785(a)(1)(D) (repealed 1993)).
179 See supra note 123.
'
8 0Robel, 389 U.S. at 263-64.
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Indeed, if the Court's focus had been on how the organization might
advance its illegal goals from a person's association, not on the individual
protected by the First Amendment, mere membership could be
constitutionally criminalized. Size can matter to an organization for the
accomplishment of its goals, whether legal or illegal. It would not be
irrational for a legislature to conclude that when members are added to an
organization with illegal goals, even if those members have no intention of
furthering the illegality, the organization has become stronger, and the
stronger the organization the more likely it will be to accomplish all its
aims, including the illicit ones. The Court, however, has been clear-the
criminalization of mere membership in an organization with both legal and
illegal aims violates the First Amendment right of association. Instead, such
association can constitutionally lead to criminal penalties only if the
government proves that the person is an active member knowing of the
illegal aims of such an organization and, in addition, specifically intends to
aid those illegal purposes.
In contrast, under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, active membership
alone would be sufficient for a constitutionally valid conviction. If I donate
books to a school run by a designated terrorist organization, HLP I's
reasoning is that I can be sent to jail because in donating the books, I am
freeing up resources that the organization might otherwise have spent on
books, and those freed resources can now be allocated to terrorism. But the
same could be said for "active membership." The Communist Party may
have sought the violent overthrow of the government, but it also proclaimed
itself "trying to remedy unsatisfactory social or economic conditions, carry
out trade-union objectives, eliminate racial discrimination, combat
unemployment, or alleviate distress and poverty."'18 An active member in
the Party may very well have picketed with the Party for union goals or to
combat racial discrimination. In doing so, that picketer easily could have
freed up another member from picketing and allowed that person to
undertake actions to further the Party's illegalities. Active membership
implies the donation of human resources to the organization, and such a
donation could further the organization's criminality just as the school
books donated to the foreign organization could further terrorism. Indeed,
active membership might easily include stuffing envelopes for the
solicitation of more members and money. That, of course, could bring
additional money that could be used for the Party's illegalities. Even so,
'81 Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469,473 (1963).
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the Court held that the government must establish more than just active
membership in a group with both legal and illegal purposes; the
government must show more than just the donation of human resources, or
personnel, to the group.' 82 The Court held that government must show that
the individual had the specific intent to further the criminal activities.
18 3
The Supreme Court has indicated that a person's association rights are
not wiped out because of the donation of fungible money to a group with
both legal and illegal purposes. Thus, in dealing with a deportation, the
Supreme Court held that giving money to the Communist Party in the form
of dues did not establish a "meaningful association" with the Party. 184 The
Court had previously held that an alien could be deported for membership
in the Communist Party only if the government established that the alien
had a "meaningful association" with the Party and was aware that it
operated "as a distinct and active political organization. ,185 In
Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, the government established that the alien
had been "a dues-paying member of a club of the Communist Party in Los
Angeles, and that he attended about 15 meetings of his Party club, one
executive meeting of the group, and one area Party convention."'' 86 The
Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support deportation
because the evidence was "extremely insubstantial in demonstrating the
'meaningful' character of the petitioner's association with the Party. ,,87
The mere giving of money to the proscribed organization did not allow for
deportation. Once again, the Court's focus was not on how the organization
could corruptly use what had been furnished to it, but on the individual
making the donation.
The Ninth Circuit's approach in HLP Ito the right of association, which
has been followed by other lower courts, 88 reduces the right of association
'
2Id. at 479-80.
l831d.
1
84 Id. at 476-77.
185Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957) (citing Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 528
(1954)).
186 Gastelum-Quinones, 374 U.S. at 474.
17/d. at 476-77.
188See People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1244 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (holding that § 2339B does not violate the right of association). The court stated, "We join
the Ninth Circuit in observing that 'there is no constitutional right to facilitate terrorism by giving
terrorists the weapons and explosives with which to carry out their grisly missions. Nor, of
course, is there a right to provide resources with which terrorists can buy weapons and
explosives."' Id. at 1244-45 (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135
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so that it will often be an empty shell 189 and ignores the analytic approach
that the Supreme Court has adopted in a long line of cases where an
individual has associated himself in various ways with a group that has both
legal and illegal purposes. These Supreme Court precedents instead
indicate that a person can be convicted of violating § 2339B only if the
person had the specific intent of aiding a designated organization's
terroristic goals when making the donation, whether that donation was
money, goods, or individual efforts.
And while the legislative history is scant as to the intent requirement of
§ 2339B, the little there is supports the specific intent embodied in the
Supreme Court's right of association cases. The Congressional Record
contains but one statement referring to § 2339B's intent element. It was
made by Senator Orin Hatch, a cosponsor of the bill of which § 2339B was
a part. When he presented the Senate Conference Report to the Senate, he
stated:
This bill also includes provisions making it a crime to
knowingly provide material support to the terrorist
functions of foreign groups designated by a Presidential
finding to be engaged in terrorist activities ....
(9th Cir. 2000), vacated by Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18933 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2004); see also Boim v. Quaranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Found.,
291 F.3d 1000, 1026 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Humanitarian, 205 F.3d at 1133) ("Conduct giving
rise to liability under § 2339B, of course, does not implicate associational or speech rights.");
United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting the contention that
§ 2339B does not violate the right of association by relying on Humanitarian Law Project v.
Reno); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 571 (E.D. Va. 2002) (rejecting an accused's
contention that § 2339B violated his right of association, the court stated that the "most apposite
authority on the issue" is Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno).
189 Cf COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 155.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down laws that penalized
association with the Communist Party absent proof that the individual
specifically intended to further the group's illegal ends. If the provision of
material support to a group were somehow different, then all of the anti-
Communist measures declared invalid by the Supreme Court could have
simply been rewritten to hinge punishment on the payment of dues, the
volunteering of time, or any of the other material manifestations of political
association. The right of association, in other words, would be left a
meaningless formality.
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I am convinced that we have crafted a narrow but
effective designation provision which meets these
obligations while safeguarding the freedom to associate,
which none of us would willingly give up.' 9°
Senator Hatch indicated that the crime was not merely giving resources
to a designated group. Instead the crime, according to him, was knowingly
giving material support to the terrorist functions of a designated
organization. According to the Senator, something more specific for
conviction is required than just donating to a group labeled by the executive
branch as terrorist. Although surely legislative intent cannot be
conclusively determined from this one statement, what can be divined
seems to indicate a congressional intent quite consistent with the Supreme
Court cases that require that the donation of support or resources to a group
with both legal and illegal goals and methods is criminal only if the
donation was made with the specific intent to further the illegalities.
VIII.CONSEQUENCES OF SECTION 2339B WITHOUT A INTENT
REQUIREMENT
Crimes should have a deterrent effect, and if § 2339B does not require
the donor to have the specific intent to aid terrorism, that deterrence should
be broad.19' Without a regular reading of the Federal Register, a person
will always have to consider the possibility of committing a federal crime
every time a donation goes to any foreign organization. This will have to
deter those who seek to aid others abroad. As David Cole and James X.
Dempsey state, "Persons legitimately concerned about conditions in other
countries, and seeking to support the political and humanitarian activities of
ethnic or nationalist groups, will be more hesitant to exercise their First
Amendment rights to support them if they fear criminal prosecution."
192
190142 CONG. REC. S3354 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis
added), available at 1996 WL 179595.
19 1See, e.g., Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of
Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global
Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341, 1349 (2004). Crimm cites reports "that well-
intentioned, law-abiding U.S. Muslims have been reticent to contribute their dutiful 'zakat' (2.5%
of a Muslim's annual income), even to reputable Muslim charities, for fear that funds might be
routed ultimately to terrorists and that they, as contributors, might be subject to prosecution." Id.
192 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 122.
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Perhaps even more important, if § 2339B does not constitutionally
require the specific intent requirement, a whole new class of political
crimes could be created. There is no reason why the model presented by
§ 2339B has to be limited to foreign organizations. States could delegate to
an official the power to designate groups as terrorist if some in the
organizations sought to achieve goals through violence and then make
donations to such designated groups criminal. Many enterprises, including
charities, corporations, and advocacy groups, could conceivably be
designated because many organizations have members and employees that
have used violence to advance the group's goals. For example, one state
might designate a pro-life group that has advocated for a constitutional
amendment prohibiting abortion and has provided counseling and adoption
services, but has also been implicated in violence against abortion
providers. Another state might designate a labor union that provides
normal union services but has also used violence in its strikes. A third
might designate a corporation whose practices produced workplace injuries.
With such crimes, donations to the pro-life group to help defray the medical
costs of the women who plan to have their babies adopted or to provide
goods to families of lawful strikers would be criminal. Working for the
designated corporation would be against the law. 193
Penalizing association with an organization without requiring specific
intent to further the illegal goals of the organization allows the creation of a
powerful tool to outlaw disfavored groups.
IX. CONCLUSION
The statutory language of § 2339B, which makes it a crime to provide
those groups designated by the Secretary of State foreign terrorist
193 Cf Cole, supra note 2, at 12.
[L]egislatures could penalize material support of any organization that has
ever engaged in any illegal activity, without regard to the purpose and use of
the particular material support. The state could make it a crime to provide
newspapers or social services to gang members, to pay dues to the
Communist Party, or to make a donation to the Republican Party, on the
grounds that each of these organizations has engaged and may in the future
engage in illegal activity and that giving them material support would free up
resources that could then be used to further the group's illegal ends.
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organizations with material resources is not clear what mental state is
required for a conviction. The statute should be interpreted to require that
the government prove that the donor knew the organization was so
designated. In addition, the First Amendment's right of association requires
that the government prove that the donor in making the donation intended
to further the terroristic activities of the organization.

